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Abstract This paper investigates inventorymanagement in amulti channel distribution systemconsisting
of amanufacturer, with a single product, and an arbitrary number of retailers that face stochastic demand.
Existence of the pure Nash equilibrium is proved and parameter restriction, which implies its uniqueness,
is derived. Also, the Stackelberg game, where themanufacturer plays the role of leader is discussed. Under
specified parameter restrictions which guarantee profitability, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of
the Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained. In addition, a comparison with a simultaneous move game is
made. The results show that when whole prices are equal to production cost, the manufacturer carries
more inventory than in the simultaneous move game.
© 2013 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
For any companywith a product to sell, making that product
available to intended customers can be a crucial strategic
issue, as important as developing the product itself. While
distribution strategy is a very traditional concern for many
companies, it has recently come under intense scrutiny due to
a number of major developments. First, the expanding role of
the Internet in consumer and business procurement activity has
created unprecedented opportunities for easy and vast access
to customers. Furthermore, the economics of material delivery
has been revolutionized by efficient and pervasive logistical
networks deployed by third-party shipping powerhouses, such
as Federal Express and United Parcel Services. As a result, many
manufacturers are reconsidering whether they should rely on
intermediaries, sell directly to end customers or even pursue
both approaches in parallel [1].
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scient.2013.05.005The multi channel distribution system chooses the third
approach for distribution of the products. It consists of a man-
ufacturer and retailers, in which a manufacturer sells his/her
products through independent retailers, as well as through
his/her wholly-owned channel. Therefore, the manufacturer si-
multaneously acts as a supplier and competitor to the retailers.
This type of distribution allows firms to extend their market
coverage by employing various distribution channels, because
firms can target many different customer segments and reach
new customer segments more efficiently. Moreover, the use
of multi channel distribution enhances the ability to meet the
needs of existing customers. Since purchase experiences vary
amongdifferent channels, customers havedifferent preferences
with respect to purchase experiences. Price and non-price
factors, such as location, product assortment and customer
service, also influence customer channel choices. In addition, a
more extensive market presence causes two things: increases
customer awareness and establishes higher brand loyalty for
existing, as well as future, products.
In a multi channel distribution system, the manufacturer
and retailers present a substitutable product. Therefore, when
a demand cannot be satisfied by each of them, because of stock
out, the customer may go to other channels. So, the profit
function of channels is influenced, not only by a personal order
decision but also by the decisions of competitors. Thereby, a
strategic interaction among the channel inventory decision is
created, and game theory is applied to analyze it.
evier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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for multi channel distribution, which consists of one manufac-
turer and an arbitrary number of retailers, is developed over
an infinite horizon. Manufacturer and retailers face stochas-
tic demand. They use a base stock policy to control inventory.
We focus on equilibrium strategies ofmanufacturer and retailer
channels, while players participate in the Nash and Stackelberg
game. Also, a comparison between these equilibria is made.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the literature review on inventory competition in
supply chains. The main model is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses inventory management in a multi channel
distribution in the two frameworks of the Nash and Stackelberg
games, and Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
Inventory competition in a supply chain is originated
from demand substitution. Parlar [2] develops a game theory
model for single period inventory control of two substitutable
products as a two person game. He proves the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash solution. Wang and Parlar [3]
extend Parlar’s model [2] to a three person game and analyze
it, both in non-cooperative and cooperative cases. In a non-
cooperative scenario, they prove the existence of the Nash
equilibrium. In a cooperative scenario, if side payments are not
allowed, they prove that Nash strategies always exist in any
case of cooperation, and if side payments are allowed, those
conditions which imply the non-emptiness of the game core
are investigated. Lippman and McCardle [4] extend Parlar’s
model [2] to an arbitrary number of retailers,whereas aggregate
industry demand is allocated among firms by splitting rules.
They examine the relationship between the Nash equilibrium
inventory levels and the demand splitting rules, and provide
conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium. Mahajan
and van Ryzin [5] analyze an inventory management model
consisting of N competing firms that provide substitutable
goods. Demand is the stochastic sequence of heterogeneous
customers who choose dynamically from the available goods.
Existence of the Nash equilibrium is proven, and it is shown
that under symmetric conditions (identical parameters), this
equilibrium is unique. Anupindi et al. [6] develop a general
framework for analysis of the inventory management of a
decentralized distribution system. This framework entails N
retailers who hold stocks locally or/and at one or more central
warehouses. This consists of two stages. At the first stage, in
order to satisfy local demand, inventory decisions are made.
In the second stage, by giving inventory levels and realized
demands, allocation of stock for satisfying residual demand is
determined, as well as the financial decision of the allocation
of revenue. At the first stage, sufficient conditions for the
existence of the pure Nash equilibrium are derived. In the
second stage, sufficient conditions for existence of the core
for allocation decisions are investigated. Granot and Sošić [7]
extend themodel proposed byAnupindi et al. [6]. The difference
between these two models is about the second stage; before
shipment of residual supplies, each retailer decides how much
of her residual supply she wishes to share with the other.
Avşar and Baykal-Gürsoy [8] extend Parlar’s model [2] into
an infinite horizon and lost sale case. Under the discounted
payoff criterion andwith stationary base stock strategies for the
inventory control system, the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium is proven. Netessine and Rudi [9] investigate
inventory management of an arbitrary number of substitutableproducts under both centralized inventory management and
competition. They show that in noncompetitive cases, the
objective function is not necessarily a concave function. Also,
a necessary optimality condition which may not be sufficient
is obtained. For competitive cases, the existence of the Nash
equilibrium is proven and conditions that imply uniqueness
are obtained. Also, optimal conditions for the competitive case
are obtained and compared with a non-competitive solution.
Dai et al. [10] analyze inventory control decisions of two
retailers in a distribution system that competes for both supply
capacity and customers. The necessary and sufficient conditions
for existence of a unique Nash equilibrium are derived. In
case the Nash equilibrium does not exist, the concept of the
Stackelberg game is used to develop optimal strategies for both
the leader and the follower. Boyaci [11] presents an inventory
managementmodel in amulti channel distribution system over
an infinite horizon, and proves the existence and uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium. Netessine et al. [12] present an inventory
control model for two retailers in a multi period environment,
wherein various customer responses to a retailer’s backorder
are considered. Serin [13], based on a newsvendor problem,
discusses the Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium
of two retailers, and presents conditions which imply that
leader profit does not improve from a simultaneous game. They
show that under appropriate conditions, the stationary base
stock inventory policy is the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Geng and Malik [14], based on a newsvendor problem, develop
an inventory control model for multi channel distribution
and propose a dynamic game, where the retailer is the
Stackelberg leader and the manufacturer is the Stackelberg
followerwho has the authority to undercut retailer orders. Both
capacitated and infinite capacity games are discussed and the
equilibrium of the games is derived. Yao et al. [15] discuss three
inventory strategies in a multi channel distribution system.
These strategies are: (1) A centralized inventory strategy, (2)
A Stackelberg inventory strategy, whereas the manufacturer
plays a role as leader, and (3) A strategywhere themanufacturer
outsources to a third party logistics provider. They obtain
and compare optimal inventory levels. Chiang [16] develops
a Markov inventory management model for multi channel
distribution, and discusses the Nash and Stackelberg games.
Also, channel conflict induced by simultaneously vertical and
horizontal competition is discussed.McGillivray and Silver [17],
Parlar and Goyal [18], and Ernst and Kouvelis [19] discuss
inventory competition in a single firm context. Also, Nie and
Chen [20] explain a similar problem.
3. Modeling assumptions and notations
We consider a manufacturer who produces a single product
at unit cost, c ≥ 0. She/He distributes it through his/her wholly
owned sales channel at price pm and through an independent
retailer, i, sales channel, (i = 1, . . . , n), at awholesale price,wri .
The retailers will resell the product through their own channels
at a price, pri . All prices are exogenous. In order to avoid trivial
solutions, it is assumed that:
c < wri < pri (i = 1, . . . , n) and c < pm.
This set of assumptions guarantees that it is profitable to sell
the product in all of the channels.
Each channel has a limited localmonopoly as a result of some
form of channel differentiation (in terms of location, brand
name, prices, service and support provided, etc.). Therefore,
the total market demand is shared between channels. Each
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satisfying their demand. This is called primary demand. We
will let D˜j (j = M, R1, . . . , Rn) denote the primary demands
of channel j (M indicates the manufacturer channel and Ri
indicates retailer, i, channel). It is assumed that the demand
profile (D˜m, D˜r1 , . . . , D˜rn) follows a known, continuous joint
distribution, with a corresponding set of marginal, strictly
increasing distribution function. For analytical tractability,
we suppose that the demands across different periods are
independent and identically distributed.
If one channel is out of stock, a fraction of unsatisfied
customers visit the other channels. The substitutability of the
channels product is modeled through substitution rates (also, it
is called market search rates), αjk, which are known. αjk (j, k =
M, R1, . . . , Rn, j ≠ k) is a fraction of channel, j, demand that
switches to channel kwhen channel j is out of stock, (0 ≤ αjk ≤
1,

j αjk ≤ 1). Substitution between channels occurs only one
time. Demand substitution by any other product is not allowed.
In the event that the product is out of stock at both channels, we
assume that the demand will be lost. It is considered that there
are no ‘‘after effects’’ of lost customer demand.
In this model, it is assumed that replenishment lead times
are zero and the manufacturer has an infinite supply capacity
at the upper echelon, which means that he can instantaneously
supply the orders of manufacturer’s and retailers’ channels.
The manufacturer does not hold any stock at this level; stocks
are kept by the manufacturer and the retailers only to satisfy
end customer demands. (This is a common assumption in
models with simultaneous horizontal and vertical channel
interactions).
The stocking decisions in the supply chain are made
periodically, and the inventory is controlled according to
base stock policies. The sequence of events that explains the
dynamics of the model is as follows: At the beginning of each
period, the on-hand inventory is observed and replenishment
orders are given accordingly. These orders are received
immediately under the infinite supply capacity and zero lead
time assumptions. Then, the channel demands are fulfilled,
unmet demand is lost, and excess stocks are carried over to the
next period. Sj and hj indicate the base stock level and holding
cost of channel j, respectively.
As indicated by Anupindi and Bassok [21], and Boyaci [11],
the above dynamic model, under an undiscounted, infinite-
horizon and average profit maximization criterion, can be
reduced to an equivalent single-period static (newsvendor-
type) model. In the remainder of the paper, we use this
equivalent single period model.
The total composite demand for each channel denoted by
Dj includes first choice customers as well as any spill over
customers substituting the product. It is given by:
Dj = D˜j +

k
αkj(D˜k − Sk)+
(j, k = M, R1, . . . , Rn, j ≠ k). (1)
Therefore, in spite of the independency of the first choice
demand at all of the channels, the actual demand faced by each
channel depends on the respective first choice demand and
stock level of other channels.
Since the manufacturer and the retailers do not undertake
any penalty cost, cost structure only consists of production
(order) and inventory holding costs. So, the manufacturer’sFigure 1: Manufacturer—n retailers multi channel distribution system.
expected profit function is given by:
Πm(Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn)
= (pm − c)Sm − (pm − c + hm)E(Sm − Dm)+
+
n
i=1
(wri − c)Sri −
n
i=1
(wri − c)E(Sri − Dri)+. (2)
And retailer, i, by:
Πri

Sm, . . . , Sri , . . . , Srn

= (pri − wri)Sri − (pri − wri + hri)E(Sri − Dri)+. (3)
A schematic representation of a multi channel distribution
system is shown in Figure 1.
4. Analysis
4.1. The Nash game and the Nash equilibrium
In the Nash game, there is no dominance relation between
the supply chain members; the manufacturer and retailers
simultaneously choose their base stock levelswith the objective
of maximizing their respective profits. So it is a one shot game:
The players choose the base stock levels at time 0 and maintain
them over an infinite horizon.
The Nash equilibrium predicts the rational behavior of
players; no player wants to unilaterally deviate from it, since
such behavior would lead to lower payoffs.
Lemma 1. Assume the following holds:
Condition C1. (pm − c + hm) >ni=1 αmri(wri − c). Then:
a. Πm(Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn) is concave in Sm for fixed (Sr1 , . . . , Srn),
and is submodular in (Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn).
b. Πri(Sm, . . . , Sri , . . . , Srn) is concave in Sri for fixed (Sm, . . . ,
Sri−1 , Sri+1 , . . . , Srn

, and is submodular in (Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn).
Condition C1 summarizes the parameter restriction that
is necessary to avoid trivial solutions and to guarantee the
concavity of the manufacturer profit function. This inequality
implies that it is more profitable for a manufacturer to satisfy
first choice demand rather than denying the sale and forcing
the customer to substitute.
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retailer profit functions imply that the products of channels are
economic substituent; increasing stocking level in one channel
results in a decreasing marginal profit of increasing stocking
level of the other channels.
Lemma 2. The manufacturer channel has a unique best response
base stock level Sm(Sr1 , . . . , Srn) given by:
Sm(Sr1 , . . . , Srn) =
Sm : P (Dm ≤ Sm)
=
pm − c −
n
i=1
αmri(wri − c)P(Dri ≤ Sri , D˜m > Sm)
pm − c − hm
 . (4)
Retailer, i, has a unique best response base stock level: Sri(Sm, . . . ,
Sri−1 , Sri+1 , . . . , Srn) given by:
Sri(Sm, . . . , Sri−1 , Sri+1 , . . . , Srn)
=

Sri : P(Dri ≤ Sri) =
pri − wri
pri − wri − hri

. (5)
It is important to note that the assumption wri < pri results in
stocking the product in equilibrium by the retailers. However,
there might be a situation in which it is more profitable for the
manufacturer not to sell directly to the customers and force
them to substitute the product in the retailers’ channels.
Assume the following holds:
Condition C2. pm − c >
n
i=1
αmri(wri − c).
Under condition C2, the manufacturer channel always stocks
the product in equilibrium. This condition implies that the
manufacturer profit margin from customers in his/her own
channel is greater than themarginal profit she would gain from
forcing customers to substitute the product in the retailers’
channels. If this condition is fulfilled, the equilibrium is an
interior point.
Proposition 1. If condition C1 is satisfied, the inventory manage-
ment game in a multi channel distribution system admits, at least,
one pure Nash equilibrium, which is obtained as follows:
P

Dm ≤ S∗m

=
pm − c −
n
i=1
αmri(wri − c)P(Dri ≤ S∗ri , D˜m > S∗m)
pm − c + hm
P

Dri ≤ S∗ri
 = pri − wri
pri − wri + hri
(i = 1, . . . , n).
(6)
Proposition 2. If condition C2 is satisfied, the Nash equilibrium of
the inventory management game in a multi channel distribution
system is unique.
4.2. Stackelberg game and Stackelberg equilibrium
The manufacturer in a multi channel distribution system
simultaneously acts as a supplier and competitor. Therefore,
he/shehas full control of his/her ownchannel. So, in this section,
we discuss the Stackelberg game, wherein the manufacturer
acts as a Stackelberg leader, chooses her base stock level first,and the retailers are Stackelberg followers and respond to any
decision of the manufacturer.
In this paper, backward induction is used to characterize
the equilibrium of a Stackelberg game. Since the retailers
act as a follower, the first best response of retailer i, S∗∗ri ,
to any decision of the manufacturer and other retailers is
obtained. Then, the manufacturer’s optimal base stock level is
derived. Therefore, the manufacturer chooses the best possible
point on the retailer’s response function and at least her
minimum gain is equal to Nash equilibrium. Since the profit
function of the manufacturer and retailers are continuous, the
Stackelberg equilibrium exists [22]. In this section, we discuss
important features of the Stackelberg equilibrium, restrictions
on parameters and demand distribution, which implies its
uniqueness.
Lemma 3. If the base stock level of the manufacturer channel
increases, the base stock level of retailer i decreases, and the rate
of change in the retailer channels is less than the substitution rate
from the manufacturer channel.
Proposition 3. If (wri − c) > αrim(pm − c + hm) +n
l=1, l≠i αrirl(wrl − c) (i = 1, . . . , n) and (pm − c + hm) >n
i=1 αmri(wri − c), then, the necessary condition to imply the
uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium is as follows:
α2mri f
′
Dri |D˜m>Sm
(Sri)fD˜ri
× (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)P(D˜m > Sm)P(Dri > Sri)
+α2mri f 2Dri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)P
2(D˜m > Sm)fDri (Sri)
−αmri fD˜ri (Sri)fD˜m(Sm)fDri (Sri)P(Dri > Sri) ≥ 0. (7)
Consider a multi channel distribution system, which consists of
one manufacturer and two retailers. It is assumed that D˜m, D˜r1
and D˜r2 follow Normal distribution, with mean, µ = 5, and
standard deviation, σ = 1. Also, the retail prices are fixed
at pm = pr1 = pr2 = 5, the wholesale prices are set at
wr1 = wr2 = 3 and the manufacturing cost is set at c = 0.
The substitution rates, αjk(j, k = M, R1, . . . , Rn, j ≠ k), are set
at 13 and all channels incur holding costs, which are assumed
hm = hr1 = hr2 = 5. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game
is S∗m = 5.8 and S∗r1 = S∗r2 = 5.4. Furthermore, the Stackelberg
equilibrium, while the manufacturer plays a role as leader, is
S∗m = 5.7 and S∗r1 = S∗r2 = 5.3.
Proposition 4. If wri = c (i = 1, . . . , n), manufacturer carries
more inventory than a simultaneous game.
While wri = c (i = 1, . . . , n), the manufacturer obtains
no profit from selling the product to the retailers, and so the
multi channel distribution system reduces to a N-horizontal
competition product. Mahajan and van Ryzin [5] proved that
channels over-stock the product. This theorem shows that
when the manufacturer plays a role as leader, the tendency to
stock the product for the manufacturer increases.
Proposition 5. In multi channel distribution system game, man-
ufacturer profitability, while she plays a role as leader, is at least
as the Nash game.
5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have developed an inventory management
model for a multi channel distribution system, which consists
of one manufacturer and an arbitrary number of retailers. We
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restriction, which implies its uniqueness, is derived. Also, we
discussed the Stackelberg game, whereas the manufacturer
plays a role as leader and selects the base stock level first.
The necessary condition for the uniqueness of the Stackelberg
equilibrium is derived and a comparison with the Nash
equilibrium is done. Results show that when whole prices
are equal to production cost, the manufacturer carries more
inventory than in the simultaneous move game.
Our research can be extended in several directions by re-
laxing the assumptions of this paper. We have assumed that
the manufacturer has an infinite supply capacity. By using the
queue approach or adding a supply constraint, this assumption
can be relaxed. Although the presence of the manufacturer in
a distribution system increases market share, it also increases
competition in the market. We propose developing a model
which will identify when it is profitable for a manufacturer to
engage in a distribution system.Wehave assumed that all of the
channels store the product solely to satisfy the demand of their
respective channels. It will be interesting to extend this model
to a situation in which the manufacturer plays a role as an up-
streammember of the supply chain, and investigate the impact
of his/her stocking level on downstreammembers. It is assumed
that if the demand of channels is unsatisfied, it will be lost. In
futurework, different customer behavior can be considered and
the impact of behavior on equilibrium can be investigated.
Appendix A. Nash equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 1. In order to prove the concavity of the
manufacturer profit function, it is sufficient to show that the
second partial derivative of Πm(Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn), with respect
to its own decision variable, Sm, is negative.
∂2Πm(Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn)
∂S2m
= −(pm − c + hm)fDm(Sm)
−
n
i=1
(wri − c)
∂2E(Sri − Dri)+
∂S2m
. (8)
The first term is obtained through Leibnitz’s rule and the
second term is achieved as follows: Based on Netessine and
Rudi [9], since the function under expectation is integrable and
has a bounded derivative, it satisfies the Lipchitz condition of
order and, hence, the expectation and the derivative can be
interchanged. So:
∂E(Sri − Dri)+
∂Sm
= E

∂(Sri − Dri)+
∂Dri
∂Dri
∂Sm

= E

I{Dri≤Sri}

αmri I{D˜m>Sm}

= αmriP(Dri ≤ Sri , D˜m > Sm)= αmriP(Dri ≤ Sri)
−αmriP(D˜ri ≤ Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm), (9)
∂2E(Sri − Dri)+
∂S2m
= α2mri fDri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)P(D˜m > Sm)
−αmri fD˜m(Sm)P(D˜ri ≤ Sri)
> −αmri fD˜m>Sm (Sm) P(D˜ri ≤ Sri), (10)
∂2Πm(Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn)
∂S2m
< −(pm − c + hm)fDm(Sm)
+
n
i=1
αmri(wri − c)fD˜m(Sm)P(D˜ri ≤ Sri)< −

(pm − c + hm)−
n
i=1
αmri(wri − c)

fDm(Sm)
< 0. (11)
It is necessary tomention that the second inequality is obtained
by fD˜m(Sm)P(D˜ri ≤ Sri) < fDm(Sm) and the third inequality is
concluded from condition C1.
For investigating the submodularity of the manufacturer
profit function, it is sufficient to show that cross-partial
derivatives are non-positive [23]. The cross-partial derivative of
Πm(Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn) is given as:
∂2Πm(Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn)
∂Sri∂Sm
= −
n
j=1
j≠i
αmrjαrirj(wrj − c)fDrj |(D˜m>Sm,D˜ri>Sri )(Srj)
× P(D˜m > Sm, D˜ri > Sri)
−αrim(pm − c + hm)fDm|D˜ri>Sri (Sm)P(D˜ri > Sri)
−αmri(wri − c)fDri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)P(D˜m > Sm), (12)
which is obviously negative.
The profit function of retailer i coincides with the classical
newsvendor problem with salvage value (wri − hri). The
concavity of Πri(Sm, . . . , Sri , . . . , Srn), with respect to its own
decision variable, Sri , is proved inNetessine andRudi [9]. Similar
to the previous section, in order to prove the submodularity, the
cross-partial derivative of Πri(Sm, . . . , Sri , . . . , Srn) is obtained
as follows:
∂2Πri(Sm, . . . , Sri , . . . , Srn)
∂Sj∂Sri
= −αjri(pri − wri + hri)
× fDri |D˜j>Sj(Sri)P(D˜j > Sj) < 0 (j ≠ ri) , (13)
which is clearly negative. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the profit function of the manufac-
turer and retailers is concave, there is a unique best response
function for each channel, which is obtained through first order
conditions [22]. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The sufficient conditions for existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium are:
(1) Strategy space for each player is nonempty, compact and
convex subsets of Euclidean space.
(2) The payoff function for each player is continuous.
(3) Quasi-concave, with respect to his/her own decision
variable [24].
By choosing a large enough closed set [0, S¯j] for each player,
condition (1) is satisfied. In addition, since the distribution
function of demand is continuous, the continuity of the players’
payoff function on the strategy set is fulfilled. Also, the
concavity of the profit function of players is proved in Lemma 1.
Therefore, there exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
In order to characterize the Nash equilibrium, it is sufficient
to solve the system of best response functions. Since profit
functions are concave, this system translates into the system of
first order conditions. 
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6)HT = H + HT =

2∂2πm
∂S2m
∂2πr1
∂Sm∂Sr1
+ ∂
2πm
∂Sr1∂Sm
· · · ∂
2πrn
∂Sm∂Srn
+ ∂
2πm
∂Srn∂Sm
∂2πm
∂Sr1∂Sm
+ ∂
2πr1
∂Sm∂Sr1
2∂2πr1
∂S2r1
· · · ∂
2πrn
∂Sr1∂Srn
+ ∂
2πr1
∂Srn∂Sr1
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
∂2πm
∂Srn∂Sm
+ ∂
2πrn
∂Sm∂Srn
∂2πr1
∂Srn∂Sr1
+ ∂
2πrn
∂Sr1∂Srn
· · · 2∂
2πrn
∂S2rn

(1
Box IProof of Proposition 2. If the strategy space of the game is
convex and all equilibria are interior, then J( ∂Πm
∂Sm
,
∂Πr1
∂Sr1
, . . . ,
∂Πrn
∂Srn
) is negative quasi-definite on the players’ strategy set, and
the equilibrium is unique [25].
Jacobian ( ∂Πm
∂Sm
,
∂Πr1
∂Sr1
, . . . ,
∂Πrn
∂Srn
) is given as:
H =

∂2πm
∂S2m
∂2πm
∂Sr1∂Sm
· · · ∂
2πm
∂Srn∂Sm
∂2πr1
∂Sm∂Sr1
∂2πr1
∂S2r1
· · · ∂
2πr1
∂Srn∂Sr1
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
∂2πrn
∂Sm∂Srn
∂2πrn
∂Sr1∂Srn
· · · ∂
2πrn
∂S2rn

. (14)
H is negative quasi-definite if H + HT is negative definite [25].
The transposition of H is as:
HT =

∂2πm
∂S2m
∂2πr1
∂Sm∂Sr1
· · · ∂
2πrn
∂Sm∂Srn
∂2πm
∂Sr1∂Sm
∂2πr1
∂S2r1
· · · ∂
2πrn
∂Sr1∂Srn
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
∂2πm
∂Srn∂Sm
∂2πr1
∂Srn∂Sr1
· · · ∂
2πrn
∂S2rn

. (15)
and: Eq. (16) is given in Box I.
According to Axes theorem, since HT is symmetric, this
matrix is negative definite if its quadratic form on the players’
strategy set is always negative [26]. The quadratic form of HT is
as follows:
Q (S) = ST (HT )S, (17)
Q

Sm, Sr1 , . . . , Srn
 = 2 ∗
j
∂2πj
∂S2j
S2j
+

k
k≠j

j

∂2πj
∂Sk∂Sj
+ ∂
2πk
∂Sj∂Sk

SjSk (∀Sj, Sk ≠ 0). (18)
Consequently, according to the concavity and submodularity
features of the payoff functions, which are proved in Lemma 1,
the quadratic form of HT on the interior point of strategy
space is always negative. On the other hand, since pm −
c >
n
i=1 αmri(wri − c) at the equilibrium point, all of the
channels stock the product and, therefore, equilibrium is an
interior point. Hence, it is concluded that under condition C2,
equilibrium is unique. Appendix B. Stackelberg equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 3. Since the best response function of retailer
i is continuous, an implicit function theorem is used to obtain
its slope. By using this theorem, the slope of the best response
function is given as:
dS∗∗ri
dSm
= −
∂2Πri
∂Sm∂Sri
∂2Πri
∂S2ri
= −
−αmri(pri − wri + hri)fDri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)p(D˜m > Sm)
−(pri − wri + hri)fDri (Sri)
= −
αmri fDri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)p(D˜m > Sm)
fDri (Sri)
. (19)
Therefore, as shown in the expression, the slope of the retailers’
best response function is always negative, which implies that
the best response of retailer i is monotonically decreasing in the
manufacturer’s strategy. Also, as shown, the rate is less than the
substitution rate from the manufacturer to retailer i. 
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to prove the uniqueness of
the Stackelberg equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that
Πm

Sm, S∗∗ri

Sm, Srl (l ≠ i)

, with respect to its own decision
variable, Sm, is quasi concave [22].
d2Πm
dS2m
= d
dSm

∂Πm
∂Sm
+ ∂Πm
∂Sr1
dS∗∗r1
dSm
+ · · · + ∂Πm
∂Srn
dS∗∗rn
dSm

= ∂
2Πm
∂S2m
+
i=n
i=1
∂2Πm
∂S2ri
dS∗∗ri
dSm
2
+ ∂Πm
∂Sri
d2S∗∗ri
dS2m
. (20)
In order to simplify calculation of
dS∗∗ri
dSm
and also
d2S∗∗ri
dS2m
, the base
formula is applied as follows: Eqs. (21)–(24) are given in Box II.
By considering Ai and Bi as below:
Ai = α2mri f 2Dri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)P
2(D˜m > Sm)fDri (Sri), (25)
Bi = α2mri f ′Dri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)fD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)
× P(D˜m > Sm)P(Dri > Sri)−αmri fD˜ri (Sri)fD˜m(Sm)fDri (Sri)P(Dri > Sri), (26)
and, also, following expression:
fD˜j(Sj)P(D˜k ≤ Sk) < fDj(Sj)
(j, k = M, R1, . . . , Rn, j ≠ k) , (27)
P(Dri > Sri) ≥ P(D˜ri > Sri). (28)
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1)
2)
3)
4)dS∗∗ri
dSm
= −
αmri

fDri (Sri)− fD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)

fDri (Sri)
=
αmri fD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)
fDri (Sri)
− αmri , (2
d2S∗∗ri
dS2m
=
αmri fD˜ri (Sri)fD˜m(Sm)fDri (Sri)− α
2
rimf
′
Dri |D˜m>Sm
(Sri)P(D˜m > Sm)fD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)
f 2Dri (Sri)
, (2
d2Πm
dS2m
= −(pm − c + hm)fDm(Sm)+
n
i=1
αmri(wri − c)fD˜m(Sm)P(D˜ri ≤ Sri)
−
n
i=1
α2mri(wri − c)fDri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)P(D˜m > Sm)
+
− (wri − c)fDri (Sri)− (pm − c + hm) α2rimfDm|D˜ri>Sri (Sm)P(D˜ri > Sri)− αrimfD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)
−
l=n
l=1
l≠i
(wrl − c)

α2rirl fDrl |D˜ri>Sri (Srl)P(D˜ri > Sri)− αrirl fD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜rl ≤ Srl)

×

−
αmri fDri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)p(D˜m > Sm)
fDri (Sri)
2
+
− αrim (pm − c + hm) P(Dm ≤ Sm|D˜ri > Sri)
× P(D˜ri > Sri)−
l=n
l=1
l≠i
αrirl(wrl − c)P(Drl ≤ Srl |D˜ri > Sri)P(D˜ri > Sri)+

(wri − c)P(Dri > Sri)

×
αmri fD˜ri (Sri)fD˜m(Sm)fDri (Sri)
f 2Dri (Sri)

−
α2mri f ′Dri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)fD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)P(D˜m > Sm)
f 2Dri (Sri)
 (2
d2Πm
dS2m
< −(pm − c + hm)fDm(Sm)+
n
i=1
αmri(wri − c)fD˜m(Sm)P(D˜ri ≤ Sri)
+
αrimα2mri (pm − c + hm) fD˜ri (Sri)f 2Dri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)P2(D˜m > Sm)
+
 l=n
l=1
l≠i
αrirlα
2
mri(wrl − c)fD˜ri (Sri)f
2
Dri |D˜m>Sm
(Sri)P
2(D˜m > Sm)P(D˜rl ≤ Srl)

−

α2mri(wri − c)fDri (Sri)f 2Dri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)P
2(D˜m > Sm)
 / f 2Dri (Sri)
+
− αrim (pm − c + hm) P(Dm ≤ Sm|D˜ri > Sri)P(D˜ri > Sri)
−
l=n
l=1
l≠i
αrirl(wrl − c)P(Drl ≤ Srl |D˜ri > Sri)P(D˜ri > Sri)+

(wri − c)P(Dri > Sri)

×
αmri fD˜ri (Sri)fD˜m(Sm)fDri (Sri)
f 2Dri (Sri)

−
α2mri f ′Dri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)fD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)P(D˜m > Sm)
f 2Dri (Sri)
 (2
Box II
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d2Πm
dS2m
< −

(pm − c + hm)−
n
i=1
αmri (wri − c)

fDm (Sm)
+
αrim(pm − c + hm)Ai +
n
l=1
l≠i
αrirl (wrl − c)Ai − (wri − c)Ai
f 2Dri (Sri )
+ αrim(pm − c + hm)P(Dm ≤ Sm|D˜ri > Sri )Bi
f 2Dri (Sri )
+
n
l=1
l≠i
αrirl (wrl − c)P(Drl ≤ Srl |D˜ri > Sri )Bi − (wri − c)Bi
f 2Dri (Sri )
< −

(pm − c + hm)−
n
i=1
αmri (wri − c)

fDm (Sm)
− (Ai + Bi)
f 2Dri (Sri )
(wri − c)− αrim(pm − c + hm)
−
n
l=1
l≠i
αrirl (wrl − c)
 . (29)
Therefore, according to condition C1 and also condition (wri −
c) > αrim(pm− c + hm)+
n
l=1,l≠i αrirl(wrl − c) (i = 1, . . . , n),
sufficient condition for the concavity of themanufacturer profit
function is as follows:
α2mri f
′
Dri |D˜m>Sm
(Sri)fD˜ri (Sri)P(D˜m ≤ Sm)
× P(D˜m > Sm)P(Dri > Sri)
+α2mri f 2Dri |D˜m>Sm(Sri)P
2(D˜m > Sm)fDri (Sri)
−αmri fD˜ri (Sri)fD˜m(Sm)fDri (Sri)P(Dri > Sri) ≥ 0.  (30)
Proof of Proposition 4.
dΠm

Sm, S∗∗r1 , . . . , S
∗∗
rn

dSm
= ∂Πm
∂Sm
+ ∂Πm
∂Sr1
dS∗∗r1
dSm
+ · · · + ∂Πm
∂Srn
dS∗∗rn
dSm
= 0, (31)
∂Πm
∂Sm
= (pm − c)− (pm − c + hm) P(Dm ≤ Sm)
−
i=n
i=1
αmri(wri − c)P(Dri ≤ Sri , D˜m > Sm), (32)
∂Πm
∂Sri
= −αrim (pm − c + hm) P(Dm ≤ Sm, D˜ri > Sri)
+ (wri − c)P(Dri > Sri)
−
l=n
l=1
l≠i
αrirl(wrl − c)P(Drl ≤ Srl , D˜ri > Sri). (33)
(S∗m, S∗r1 , . . . , S
∗
rn) is the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous
game, at this point ∂Πm
∂Sm
= 0. On the other hand, with respect
to assumption wri = c (i = 1, . . . , n), ∂Πm∂Sri < 0 and, hence,
since
dSr1
dSm
< 0, it is concluded that dΠmdSm > 0. Therefore, it is
concluded that the manufacturer carries more inventory than a
simultaneous move game. Proof of Proposition 5. Since the manufacturer chooses the
best possible point on the best response function of the
retailer, therefore at least her minimum gain is equal to Nash
equilibrium. 
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